Developer at Paperpile and social scientist.
Research interests include international political economy, financial crises, nationalism, international relations, and sovereign debt.
Currently exploring on (1) the political economy of financial crisis intervention, (2) the link between age structure and social policy, and (3) an empirical method for identifying institutional complimentarities.
Statistical Methods: OLS and logit regressions, Hierarchical Linear Modeling, Survival Analysis, Longitudinal Analysis, Machine Learning, Social Network Analysis.
Statistical Software: Stata, R, some SPSS, some SAS
Other: LaTeX, HTML, CSS
in Accounting, Economics, and Law - a Convivium. Forthcoming.
This comment presents three arguments. First, that while The Power of Inaction focuses on the role of banks within bailout negotiations, this framework can be gainfully expanded by considering the government side of the bailout negotiations: evidence from the U.S. and German cases suggests that the government, as well as banks, can wield the threat of inaction in a bailout negotiation. Second, that coordinated interventions were implemented in countries where the largest leading banks were weak, and vice versa. As this singularly determines the type of intervention, it leaves little room for making strong inferences on other factors. Third, that Woll’s study indicated that coordinated interventions are more cost-efficient than uncoordinated interventions. An unexplored implication is that government negotiators can gainfully persuade banks to take part in a coordinated intervention.[Link]
with Axel van den Berg. In Lechevalier, Arnaud & Jan Wielgohs (eds.) Social Europe: a Dead End. Djøf Publishing. pp. 103-132,
We examine the implementation of centralized policies in Canada and the European Unions - both regions in which the "federal" government has limited de jure power over constituent members. There are notable procedural differences between federal-level policy formulation in Canada and the EU which help explain the relative success of the Canadian government in implementing broad federal policies - such as health care and pensions - and the relatively lackluster EU attempts. However, two other factors were also found to be crucial: the power of electoral politics and the power of the purse. The federal government in Canada is directly elected and so has a strong incentive to champion the expansion of popular welfare-state programs, whereas power in the EU resides in the European Commission and European Council, which do not face a similar calculus. More important still is the Canadian "doctrine of spending power", whereby the Canadian federal government can spend its budget to subsidize any program and impose any terms it sees fit - enabling it to shape social policy areas which are nominally under the purview of the provinces. The EU, by contrast, has neither the spending power, not the legal precedent to affect member-state policy in a similar fashion.[Link]
with John A. Hall. In Nations and Nationalism 20(4):742-59.
The rise of nationalism has long been linked to the end of empire. The nationalist imperative, one state, one nation, appears to be incompatible with the multiethnic compositions of empires, yet multiethnic nation-states clearly exist. Nationalism in the periphery of the Hapsburg Empire has been used to support this supposed incompatibility, but the case itself is inconclusive. The decomposition of the Danish imperial monarchy in the years of 1848 and 1864 was indisputably caused by nationalism and can thus contribute to this debate. It supports the proposition that nationalism causes the end of empire but also adds nuance. The timescale over which nationalism took center stage in the internal politics of the Danish Imperial Monarchy implies that decomposition could have been averted if accommodative policies were introduced in the early 19th century. Finally, the main actors in the Danish case were Danish nationalist in the imperial core which, when faced with the threat of power-sharing with the German-speaking periphery, became determined to rid themselves of it.[Link]
with John A. Hall. In Hall, John. A., Ove Korsgaard, and Ove Kay Pedersen (eds.). 2014. Building the Nation. Grundtvig and Danish National Identity. McGill-Queen’s University Press.
At the dawn of the 19th century, both Switzerland and Denmark were small multiethnic polities. Switzerland remained multiethnic through a federalist constitution. While this approach had its advocates in Denmark, the chapter analyzes the differences which made Federalism both unfeasible and unpopular in Denmark.[Link]